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**U.S.-MEXICO BILATERAL RELATIONS AND IMPORTANCE OF
MEXICAN MILITARY IN THE DRUG-CONTROL STRATEGY**

BY

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Mexican Military in the Drug-Control Strategy**

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ABSTRACT

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The governments of the United States and Mexico will have much to build as a result of the sustained collaborative relationship between both countries. Overall, the comprehensive bilateral cooperation policy to control the supply and demand for drugs has resulted in an improved understanding regarding the problems and challenges each country faces.

Over the past five years, both countries have built a solid institutional structure for counter-drug cooperation. For the first time, both countries have begun implementing a broad, comprehensive and structured collaboration plan focused on the joint, long-term efforts: the *Bilateral Drug Control Strategy*.

Within this framework, greater understanding has been attained between the Mexican and U.S. agencies. This has led to a greater understanding of the particular problems that each country faces and of the national control mechanisms to face these problems.

Mexican and U.S. authorities (PGR, Mexican Secretariat of the Navy, Mexican Secretariat of National Defense, Mexican Secretariat of the Interior, Department of Justice, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs, JIATF-E, and JIATF-W) have increased their coordination regarding interdiction actions. In this sense, the bilateral coordination has been strengthened with the creation, in June 2000, of the Mexico-U.S. Bilateral Cooperation Group for Matters of Drug Interception. This forum meets on a regular basis to exchange and discuss essential information in order to increase the effectiveness of the interdiction efforts of both countries.

The secretariat of National Defense represents one of the most important key players on the execution of the *Drug Control National Program* 1995-2000, due basically by its force structure, discipline and experience in eradication of poppy and marijuana crops, air, land and sea interception of illicit drug, intelligence and interagency operations, and also is committed in fighting violence generated by organized crime related with drug-trafficking.

This research represents a review of the *Bilateral Drug Control Strategy*. It only provides a basic assessment on the recent policy development and sets a series of recommendations for actions by the new administrations for both countries. I am convinced that this is the moment when responsible and creative leadership can help in resolving many problems for the two nations.

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PREFACE

As we enter the 21st century, the impact of globalization and the spread of democratic governments have opened the door to a new era of security challenges and opportunities. The research of the U.S. and Mexico Bilateral relations and the importance of the Mexican military in the Drug Control Strategy have been chosen to fulfill my academic requirement for the Army War College FY 2001.

As a Mexican Army Officer, my concern is to research and learn more about one of the major threats that endanger the regional security, stability and relations with United States. The problem of controlling the illegal drugs, violence, and related crime is a very complex one, where no single country is capable to fight for itself. The drug trafficking has its origin in multiple causes, and at the same time generates grand variety of side effects. Even though the action taken must be oriented in integral, and coordinated way to counteract against it, without neglecting any of its ramifications.

In analyzing this phenomenon, considered as a problem of national security, it has integrated the resources all the agencies of the public sector to go on with the strategies to fight it, and support the position of Mexico in the international fora, where it has manifested the decision to tighten the coordination with other countries to interchange information with the purpose of becoming integrated into a common front to this problem that does not recognize frontiers; with full respect to the sovereignty of the States under the principle of self determination; and no intervention; rejecting the application of extra-territorial laws that rule in other countries; and by the establishment of multinational forces.

The Secretariat of National Defense is concerned about its commitment and importance of its role in the war against drug trafficking, assuming its responsibility into the National Strategy framework, and implementing inter-agency operations supporting the law enforcement organizations. The Mexican Army and Air Force conduct basically eradication of illegal crops and interception operations. However, this responsibility does not represent its primary constitutional mission, for its Presidential mandate, and taking into consideration that the threat affects the National Security environment, the Armed Forces will continue to carry out these kinds of activities. Meanwhile the Federal Preventive Police fully assume the leading activities in the war against drugs. Even then the Armed Forces will decrease their participation, but stand ready to continue cooperating with other agencies as needed.

Nevertheless as the former president Ernesto Zedillo said: "*I believe and I want to be very clear about it—that wherever you have drug trafficking, there is corruption*". It is clear that some officials at all levels have been corrupted by money or threaten their lives or their families. This has been true essentially inside the law enforcement organizations and the judicial system. Whatever will be the causes, they have been affecting the interests of both nations. To avoid corruption in those organizations the selection process must be very demanding and zero tolerance seems to be the key. Also increasing the training should help with the corruption problem.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S.-Mexico bilateral relations have been getting better, particularly since NAFTA has taken effect. The drug trafficking issue represents one of the major threats that affects the security and stability of society anywhere on the globe.

Mexico is a key country for U.S. drug control policy. It is a significant supplier of heroin and marijuana entering the U.S. market. The country also sits astride the main transshipment routes for cocaine being smuggled into the United States from source countries in South America. An extremely porous and lightly guarded 760-mile southern frontier with Belize and Guatemala, as well as 5,804 miles of coastline with innumerable clandestine landing spots, help make Mexico a primary trafficking route.

Mexico's national anti-drug strategy encompasses the full range of actions called for in the 1988 UN Drug Convention and highlights the importance of international cooperation, particularly with neighboring states. As a follow up to the May 1997 "Declaration of the U.S.-Mexico Alliance Against Drugs" and the "U.S.-Mexico Bi-National Drug Threat Assessment," the two nations released the "U.S.-Mexico Bi-National Drug Strategy" in February 1998. Since then, working groups have drafted, and adopted in February 1999, performance measures of effectiveness to enhance implementation of the Strategy and permit the governments to evaluate progress toward its goals. In November, the Government of Mexico applied to the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) as a cooperating and supporting nation; if followed through, this indicates its interest in becoming more active in international money laundering fora.

Prompted by further revelations of official corruption, including within dedicated, elite counter-narcotics units, the Government of Mexico intensified its efforts to purge its counter-narcotics entities of corruption and strengthen their ability to combat narcotics trafficking and related criminal activities. The Office of the Attorney General's (PGR) Confidence Control Center, established in 1997, has screened more than 1,200 current and prospective members of the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health (FEADS) and the Organized Crime Unit (OCU).

Mexico played a major role in planning the June 1998 UN Special Session on Drug Control and in drafting the political declaration and action plans, which obligate participating states to carry out specific actions against narco-trafficking. Recognizing the threat to national sovereignty from criminal activities, the Zedillo administration proposed in November the formation of a 10,000-member national police force that

would be charged with investigation and prevention of criminal activities that fall under federal jurisdiction. The Government of Mexico and the U.S. cooperated on a program of training for Mexican law enforcement personnel that concentrated on increasing capabilities and professionalism to enhance public confidence.

Mexico's anti-drug enforcement actions included air, land, and maritime drug interdiction, organized crime investigations, a pronounced increase in the amount of seized property and assets, money laundering investigations, chemical diversion control, and other enforcement actions. In late 1998, the PGR seized 45 metric tons of marijuana and at least three luxury hotels, scores of homes, ranches, offices, restaurants, yachts, luxury cars, and other property from raids against suspected drug traffickers. The PGR's Organized Crime Unit (OCU), Special Investigations Unit (SIU), carried out narcotics investigations and Bilateral Task Forces (BTF) located in eight major cities. The Government of Mexico expanded and improved the capability of the FEADS and the OCU, but better equipment, more personnel, and improved training are needed to bring these units to full force.

Since the early 1970s, the Mexican military has been committed in the fight against drugs, even though it is not a part of their primary missions. Meanwhile the National Police develops and assumes the full spectrum of its responsibilities. The Armed forces then, will be less dependable in carrying out some supporting activities such as prevention, eradication, and interception in small scale. Into the national security strategy the drug trafficking is still the major threat for the security of the nation, and the national and international strategies represent the keystone to provide guidance as an integral endeavor to eliminate the phantom of illicit drugs. To do so; it is necessary to enforce our relations with the U.S. overall in those border areas where the drug trafficking cartels have settled to conduct their illicit activities.

Since President Vicente Fox took office in his new administration, he has been characterized for facing decisively the big problems of the country like drug trafficking. He is taking the needed steps to reorient the policies in drug-trafficking efforts basically with the United States. One of his major concerns is the corruption that exists with some authorities in charge of fighting the problem. It is demonstrated in the recent agreements reached at the beginning of March 2001, by the Director of the FBI and the Head of the Mexican General Attorney Office, to organize Joint Task Forces to conduct operations all along the border area to reduce the violence and crime related with drug-trafficking. As well, the Mexican National Police will receive training in the U.S.

I. **BACKGROUND.**

A. GENERAL OVERVIEW.

The Governments of the United States and Mexico recognize that the current dimensions of international drug trafficking and related crimes extend beyond national boundaries and exceed the capacity of any nation to face them in isolation. These have become a serious problem that affects the health and security of international society.

The drug threat cannot be confronted by one nation alone. Therefore, the United States and Mexico believe that bilateral and multilateral cooperation among nations is necessary to achieve acceptable results in the struggle against production, distribution, trafficking, and consumption of illicit drugs. The same is true with regard to related crimes such as money laundering, diversion of precursor and essential chemicals, and arms trafficking.

Both countries have decided to continue promoting sub-regional, regional, and world cooperation against drugs. In this context, and in order to strengthen bilateral collaboration to confront the problem, the United States and Mexico agreed to prepare a bilateral anti-drug cooperation strategy that will complement the national drug control strategies in effect in each country. The strategy was developed with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction of the United States and Mexico.¹

The binational drug strategy presents 16 points of alliance that covers the full spectrum of the drug trafficking threat, with the following:

General Objectives

- Stop the increase in and reduce the illicit consumption, production, and traffic of narcotics and psychotropic substances in both countries.
- In coordination, treat the problems generated by drugs in the realms of health and safety in both societies.
- Agree on the actions necessary to reduce the production, trafficking, distribution, and consumption of drugs, as well as to eliminate crimes related to drugs such as diversion of precursor and essential chemicals, money laundering, and arms trafficking.

The binational cooperation strategy seeks in the end to contribute to the elimination of the effects which drugs have in both societies. The collaborative actions described in the Binational Strategy will complement the national policies defined in the United States National Drug Control Strategy and Mexico's National Program for Drug Control 1995- 2000.

Therefore, both countries have mutually agreed to design and apply specific collaborative programs in priority areas. Both countries recognize that bilateral cooperation, to be effective, can only be developed through adherence to the principles of sovereignty, equality and the integrity of national territory, as well as non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States. Both nations agreed that bilateral collaboration is achieved on the basis of the following principles: shared responsibility, adoption of an integrated approach to the subject matter, balance, and reciprocity, and efficient application of the law in each country.²

B. REGIONAL OVERVIEW.

Few countries are as important to the United States as Mexico. Sharing a 2,000-mile border and increasingly integrated with one another economically and socially, the two nations have become interdependent to an extent that could hardly have been imagined a decade ago. In the process, Mexico's problems have increasingly become U.S. problems.³

For years, U.S. Active and Reserve Component military support to drug law enforcement along the border has sparked protests in the United States and from Mexican officials and media sources. Charges that the border is being "militarized" became increasingly common in the mid-1990s.⁴ These protests peaked in May 1997, when a U.S. Marine patrol/observation team supporting the Border Patrol near Redford, Texas, shot and killed an 18-year-old American citizen, Ezequiel Hernandez, who had fired in their direction.⁵ An investigation found that the Marine corporal who fired the shot acted in accordance with existing rules of engagement and he was not charged.⁶ However, the incident has become a familiar topic in debates about using U.S. military forces to support law enforcement.

The prospect of increased and broader border security roles for the military has surfaced periodically over the last few years and emerged forcefully again on 10 June 1999. On that date, the US House of Representatives approved an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 that would modify Title 10 rules governing military support to law enforcement. The House identified the U.S.-Mexican border as a weak point in protecting the U.S. homeland from a range of

transnational threats. The amendment called for the Secretary of Defense—with the agreement of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury—to "assign members of the Armed Forces, under certain circumstances and subject to certain conditions, to assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) [including the Border Patrol] and the United States Customs Service in the performance of border protection functions."⁷ This amendment would explicitly extend military support beyond counter-drug duties and include "preventing the entry of terrorists" and "illegal aliens" as well as other law enforcement functions. It would not, however, give powers of arrest and search and seizure.⁸

There was some negative domestic reaction—reportedly including Pentagon opposition—but the most rapid and vociferous response was from Mexico. Mexican articles and editorials decried the vote, characterizing it as "unacceptable militarization of the border, offensive and disproportionate" and incompatible with constructive bilateral relations. They questioned the implication that Mexico served as a base for foreign terrorists and invoked the name of Ezequiel Hernandez as a warning of what might happen to migrants and border residents.⁹

The eventual success of this House initiative was far from assured. But while a similar effort failed two years earlier in the Senate the latest amendment had far more resonance than past attempts.¹⁰ This was largely due to the 1998 signing of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62 (Combating Terrorism), PDD-63 (Protecting America's Critical Infrastructure), as well as the U.S. military's ongoing developments of Homeland Defense concepts and approaches.¹¹ Although Homeland Defense continues to evolve in content and scope, it clearly has implications for the Armed Forces' role in border security.¹²

While the United States contemplated military support to law enforcement over the last several years, substantial changes were taking place in military and police interaction in Mexico. Before addressing these developments, it is necessary to define past and recent border security developments.

Mexico's mid-1990s' preoccupation with insurgencies in Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca and other states soon broadened to include skyrocketing criminal violence, institutional corruption, drug operations and other organized crime.¹³ Along the U.S.-Mexico border and in the Mexican interior, drug traffickers and other criminals frequently targeted police and other law enforcement personnel for intimidation or elimination. In this environment, Mexican authorities sought to better use their law enforcement and defense resources to control security threats ranging from insurgency, to drug and arms trafficking, to violent street crime. At the same time, the U.S. government was reportedly insisting that Mexico get tough with drug traffickers and pushing for a more active role by the Mexican military in drug eradication and interdiction.¹⁴

The resulting actions by the Mexican government changed Mexican military-law enforcement interaction generally and altered the composition of Mexico's security presence at the border.

The Mexican government determined to employ the Defense Secretariat (*Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional*—comprising the Army and Air Force) and the Marine Secretariat (*Secretaría de Marina*—constituting the Navy and amphibious elements) far more prominently in internal security and law enforcement roles. Beginning in the mid-1990s, Mexico purged, reorganized and reinforced elements of the federal and state police establishments and modernized training and equipment in the growing Mexican armed forces. Increasingly the military bolstered the struggle to restore and sustain adequate internal security and public safety. While judged necessary by hard-pressed Mexican authorities dealing with multiple problems, involving the military also intensified internal debate about its proper role in countering vigorous, growing threats to Mexican stability.

Police corruption has been revealed at every level of administration in every Mexican state. There is scarcely a criminal enterprise without police complicity—major or minor, commonplace or bizarre.¹⁵ Police collusion with drug and other criminal organizations, extortion, bribery and the commission of robberies, assaults and kidnappings is widespread and has affected police, customs and immigration officials on the border as it has in the interior. The Mexican government hoped that military discipline and integrity would help root out the culture of police corruption.

As a consequence, Mexican authorities began a dramatic restructuring of Federal Judicial Police (*Policía Judicial Federal* [PJF]) and analogous State Judicial Police (*Policía Judicial Estatal* [PJE]) establishments throughout Mexico, as well as the capital's Public Security Secretariat (*Secretaría de Seguridad Pública* [SSP]). Large numbers of corrupt officers were dismissed and many top leadership positions were filled with military personnel. Some military officers were assigned to police establishments in border states such as Baja California, Chihuahua and Tamaulipas among others.¹⁶ Overall, some form of military involvement in law enforcement exists in most of Mexico's 31 states (in addition to the Federal District).¹⁷ The Mexican Army continues to train new generations of PJF agents in physical fitness, weapons skills, rappelling, land navigation and counter-drug and counter-terrorism techniques.¹⁸

With the aim of better interdicting drug and arms traffickers, Mexican army units simultaneously redeployed in some states, including along the border. Employing Mexican military units in counter-drug operations—for interdiction, eradication and support to the police in drug sweeps—is far from a new phenomenon. Army and police counter-drug interaction gained some momentum during the administration

of President Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982). It developed into a more "systematic campaign" during the tenure of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), and his successor has intensified all the more under President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000).¹⁹ From the mid 1990s on, however, the Mexican army has been more prominent in border areas counter-drug patrols.

From the international perspective, Mexico is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Drugs as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. It also subscribes to regional anti-drug commitments, including the 1996 Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere and 1990 Declaration of Ixtapa; which commit signatories to take strong action against drug trafficking, including controlling money laundering and preventing chemical diversion. Mexico has bilateral narcotics accords with 32 countries besides of U.S.

The U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty has been in force since 1980. a U.S.-Mexico protocol to the extradition treaty permitting the temporary surrender for trial of fugitives who are serving a sentence in one country but also are wanted on criminal charges in the other was approved by U.S. Senate in October 1998 and ratified by President Clinton in January 1999. The Mexican Senate approved the protocol in December 2000, and its entry into force is anticipated in early 2001.²⁰

U.S. relations with Mexico are as important and complex as with any country in the world. A stable, democratic, and economically prosperous Mexico is fundamental to U.S. interests. U.S. relations with Mexico have a direct impact on the lives and livelihood of millions of Americans – whether the issue is trade and economic reform, drug control, migration, or promotion of democracy. The U.S. and Mexico are partners in NAFTA, and enjoy a rapidly developing trade relationship.

The scope of U.S.-Mexican relations goes far beyond diplomatic and official contacts; it entails extensive commercial, cultural, and educational ties, as demonstrated by the annual figure of nearly 290 million legal crossings from Mexico to United States. In addition, more than a half-million American citizens live in Mexico. More than 2,600 U.S. companies have operations there, and the U.S. accounts for 60% of all foreign direct investment in Mexico.

Since 1981, the management of the broad array of U.S.-Mexico issues has been formalized in the U.S.-Mexico Bi-National Commission, composed of numerous U.S. cabinet members and their Mexican counterparts. The Commission holds annual plenary meetings, and many sub-groups meet during the course of the year to discuss trade and investment opportunities, financial cooperation, consular issues and migration, legal affairs and anti-narcotics cooperation, cultural relations, education, energy, border affairs, environment and natural resources, labor, agriculture, health, housing and urban development, transportation, fisheries, tourism, and science and technology. The Commission signed a new agreement on border affairs, the environment, public health, transportation safety, energy, education, and cultural heritage.

A strong partnership with Mexico is critical to controlling the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. The U.S. has certified Mexico as fully cooperating in this effort based on significant counter-narcotics progress in 2001 and a number of new and significant Mexican initiatives in fighting drug trafficking. This is the best way to ensure that Mexico's cooperation and anti-drug effort grow even stronger.

Since 1996 the U.S. and Mexico established a High-Level Contact Group (HLCG) on narcotics control to explore joint solutions to the shared drug threat, to coordinate the full range of narcotics issues, and to promote closer law enforcement coordination. President Zedillo formalized his government's commitment to counter-narcotics cooperation with the United States by signing the *"Declaration of the Mexican-U.S. Alliance Against Drugs"* with president Clinton in May 1997. The bi-national alliance worked throughout 1997 to produce a *"U.S.-Mexico Bi-national Drug Strategy,"* a document which contains 16 alliance objectives, ranging from drug shipment interdiction to extradition of drug traffickers. Following the controversy in 1998 over U.S. money laundering investigation of Mexican Banks and individuals (operation Casa Blanca), the two governments agreed on procedures to improve communication and coordination in cases of sensitive law enforcement investigations. During their February 1999 meetings in Mexico, Presidents Clinton and Zedillo adopted comprehensive benchmarks (Performance Measures of Effectiveness) both governments will now use to assess how well the two countries are meeting the goals and objectives of the joint strategy.²¹

The Bi-National Commission is chaired by the Attorney General of both countries and the High-Level Contact Group on Drug Control (HLCG), headed by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the U.S. Attorney General, the Mexican Foreign Secretary, and the Mexican Attorney General. The HLCG met in April and August 2000 to report on progress made by its working groups (money

laundering, demand reduction, arms trafficking, and interception) to review action plans and goals, and to develop priorities for future cooperation. The senior Law Enforcement Plenary Group also continues its regular meeting to monitor and guide bilateral actions at the practical and operational level.

The U.S. and Mexico are working cooperatively to reduce the demand for illegal drugs through prevention, education and public awareness, treatment and research. In addition the two countries are cooperating to stop drug trafficking, money laundering, diversion of essential and precursor chemicals, and firearms trafficking. In the mid-90s, drug abuse and trafficking represented a serious health risk for the U.S. and Mexican population, and a growing threat for the security of both nations. Since March 1996, responding to the challenge of common enemy, President Ernesto Zedillo and President William Clinton ordered those in charge of the anti-drug programs to design more efficient bilateral policies to combat this phenomenon. Their policies required comprehensive coordination based on the principles of shared responsibility, adoption of an integrated approach to the subject matter, balance and reciprocity, and effective application of the laws in each country.

The Mexican and U.S. governments have developed a more effective bilateral cooperation policy to deal with all issues related to drug control. This cooperation lies within the framework of a set of agreements, mechanisms, and procedures to facilitate long-term policy planning, communication, and coordinated efforts. The challenge presented demands a sustained bi-lateral effort in the future. In order to face this challenge, Mexico and the United States have achieved progress in establishing, for the first time, cooperation instruments which comprehensively tackle the problem for drugs and breaks up the drug production and trafficking networks in both countries.²²

On March 9, 2001, for the first time in history, Agents of Mexico's General Attorney Office and FBI worked together in the first Joint Task Force between U.S. and Mexico with the purpose of fighting the drug trafficking and organized crime all along the border. The two agencies have started the preparation of the Bi-National Group, with the interchange of intelligence about the most concerning crime, as well as training of the Judicial Federal Police in the United States.²³

Federal authorities have made combating corruption a top priority because of the threat it represents to Mexico's democratic institutions. The Government of Mexico investigated corruption cases and was active in multilateral fora against corruption. Mexico is a signatory to the anti-corruption agreements of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.

Despite public statements and efforts by President Zedillo and other key government officials, corruption continues to be a serious problem in Mexican institutions, including federal, state, and local police agencies. The Government of Mexico has generally responded to revelations of corruption with administrative reorganization of the corrupted agency and dismissal or reassignment of the compromised officials. This situation is beginning to change because of better screening and internal controls as well as moves to prosecute corrupt officials.

In 1998, the Government of Mexico uncovered evidence of corruption in the special vetted units that had been specially created to avoid corruption. This appears to have resulted in the compromise of several investigations in which the U.S. supplied investigative information. Revelations of corruption at the highest levels of the Organized Crime Unit (OCU) undermined the confidence of U.S. law enforcement in its working relationship with the unit. Law enforcement officials from both countries are working to restore mutual confidence.

While there have been successful corruption investigations and prosecutions, more are needed - yet ensuring police integrity is only part of the solution. The Ministry of Government (SEGOB) plans to administer examinations to 47,000 auxiliary and judicial police nationwide in 1999. This will give SEGOB the opportunity to check whether the examinees have outstanding warrants against them and permit it to dismiss poor performers. Those who pass these exams will receive additional training, a pay raise, increased benefits, and will help bring about enhanced professionalism, performance, public image, and lifestyle.

Combating corruption is a long-term challenge that requires sustained effort at all levels of government and society. The Government of Mexico has made progress through development of new personnel and information databases and institutional improvements to deter corruption. It is critical that Mexico continue to investigate all allegations of corruption and take strong action against personnel who have been compromised, both for the integrity of its institutions and the confidence of its international partners.²⁴

II. UNITED STATES COUNTER DRUG POLICY.

A. LEGITIMACY.

The ways in which the federal government responds to drug abuse and trafficking are outlined in the following laws and executive orders:

- The Controlled Substances Act, Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
- Executive Order No. 12564 (1986) made refraining from drug use a condition of employment for all federal employees.
- The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 established as a policy goal the creation of a drug-free America.
- The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
- Executive Order No. 12880 (1993) and Executive Orders Nos. 12992 and 13023 (1996).
- The Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 expanded ONDCP's mandate and authorities and set forth additional reporting requirements and expectations, including:
 - Development of a long-term national drug strategy.
 - Implementation of a robust performance-measurement system.
 - Commitment to a five-year national drug-control program budget.
 - Permanent authority granted to the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program, along with improvements in HIDTA management.
 - Greater demand-reduction responsibilities given to the Counter-Drug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC).
 - Statutory authority for the President's Council on Counter-Narcotics.
 - Increased reporting to Congress on drug-control activities.
 - Reorganization of ONDCP to allow more effective national leadership.
 - Improved coordination among National Drug Control Program agencies.
 - Establishment of a Parents' Advisory Council on Drug Abuse.

This *Strategy* sets in motion policies and programs designed to make progress toward these targets. It contains careful analysis of what is achievable by when. It also presents a detailed performance measurement system that links goals, objectives, and mid- and long-term targets.²⁵

The U.S. National Drug Control Strategy starts by stressing the duty of the government to provide security to its citizens. The Constitution of the United States articulates the obligation of the federal government to uphold the public good, providing a bulwark against all threats, foreign and domestic. Drug abuse, and illicit use of alcohol and tobacco by those under legal age, constitutes such a threat. Toxic, addictive substances are hazardous to our safety and freedom, producing devastating crime and health problems. Drug abuse diminishes the potential of citizens for growth and development. However, the federal government cannot address the problem alone. Drug abuse demands a comprehensive solution involving not only federal programs but also efforts on part of states, countries, cities, communities, families, civic groups, coalitions, and other organizations.²⁶

B. DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTER DRUG STRATEGY.

Between 1989 and 1999. The strategies for Drug Control were produced annually in United States. In such documents the strategies increasingly recognized the importance of preventing drug use by young people. The various documents affirmed that no single approach could rescue the nation from the cycle of drug abuse. A consensus was reached that drug prevention; education, treatment, and research must be completed by supply-reduction abroad, on our borders, and within the United States. Each strategy shared the commitment to maintain and enforce anti-drug laws. All strategies, with growing success tied policy to scientific body of knowledge about nation's drug problems. The 1996 *Strategy* established five goals and thirty-two supporting objectives as the basis for a coherent, long-term national effort. These goals remain the heart of the 2000 *Strategy* and will guide federal drug control agencies over the next five years. These goals are useful for state and local governments as well as the private sector.

Goals of the National Drug Control Strategy

- Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.
- Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.
- Reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use.
- Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
- Break foreign and domestic sources of supply.

The actual National Drug Strategy is long-term, and recognizes the devastating effect drug abuse has on the nation's public health and safety. The strategy focuses on prevention, treatment, research, law enforcement, border protection, drug supply reduction, and international cooperation. With those actions is expecting to have a 50% decrease in drug use and availability and at least a 25% in the consequences of drug abuse by 2007. The strategy focuses on young people, seeking to educate them about the dangers of illegal drugs, alcohol, and tobacco.

Effective law enforcement is essential in reducing drug-related crime within the United States. Illegal drug trafficking inflicts violence and corruption on the communities. The criminal that comes with drug trafficking has both a domestic and international component. Domestic traffickers are often linked with international organizations, Federal, State, and local law enforcement organizations. Working together through programs like the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA); they must share information in order to maximize their impact on criminal drug trafficking organizations.

The strategy stresses the need to protect borders from drug incursion and cut drug supply more effectively in domestic communities. It emphasizes initiatives to share intelligence and make use of the latest technology in these efforts. As a major gateway for the entry of illegal drugs into the United States, the Southwest border receives considerable attention within the strategy. Resources have also been allocated to close other avenues of drug entry into United States, including the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico,

* The Canadian border, and all air and sea ports.

The United States seeks to curtail illegal drug trafficking in the transit zone between source countries and the U.S. Multinational efforts in the Caribbean, Central America, Europe, and the Far East are being coordinated to exert maximum pressure on drug traffickers. The United States supports a number of international efforts against drug trafficking that are being coordinated with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the organization of the American States (OAS).

Supply-reduction operations can best be mounted at the source: the Andean Ridge for cocaine and heroine; Mexico for methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana; and South East Asia and South Central Asia for heroin. Where access to source regions is limited by political complications, the U.S. supports international efforts to curtail the drug trail.

The strategy is based on sound research, technology, and intelligence. It will be adjusted according to feedback from ONDCP's Performance Measures of Effectiveness system. This last instrument named with the purpose of provide information to policy makers so that they can evaluate what parts of the strategy have been achievable, what parts need more effort, and what parts ought to change.

Five principal departments –Treasury, Justice, Transportation, State, and Defense—are concerned with drug-control issues along the southwest border. These agencies have collaborated in six drug-control areas – drug interdiction, anti-money laundering, drug and immigration enforcement, prosecutions, counter-drug support, and counter-drug cooperation with Mexico. During the past decade, the federal presence along the southwest border expanded. Customs' budget for Southwest border program increased 72% since FY 1993. The number of assigned DEA special agents increased 37% since FY 1999. The number of assigned INS agents almost doubled since FY 1990. The DoD's drug-control budget for the southwest border increased 53% since FY 1990. the number of U.S. attorneys handling cases there went up 80% since FY 1990. The Southwest Border Initiative enabled federal agencies to coordinate intelligence and operational assignments at Customs, DOJ's Special Operations Division, HIDTA, and state and local law-enforcement agencies.

To improve coordination along the land borders of the United States, the Department of Justice and Treasury – along with other agencies with border responsibilities – established the Border Coordination Initiative (BCI). Organized as a five-year program and initially emphasizing the southwest border, BCI is helping to create integrated border management to improve the effectiveness of this joint effort. It emphasizes increased cooperation to support the interdiction of drugs, illegal aliens, and other contraband while maintaining the flow of legal immigration and commerce.

The correlation between drugs and crime is high. Trafficking and use of illicit drugs are inextricably linked to a crime and place a tremendous social and economic burden on the communities. Drug diverts precious resources that support the quality of life all Americans strive to achieve. Illegal drugs create widespread problems that produce fear, violence, and corruption. Residents are afraid to go out of their homes, legitimate businesses flee urban neighborhoods, and the quality of life suffers.²⁷

Another instrument applied in the border is The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program run by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). It coordinates federal, state, and local efforts to

combat drug trafficking in critical areas of the United States.²⁸ ONDCP requires each high intensity drug trafficking area to:

- Assess drug threats within its geographic area.
- Prepare strategies and initiatives to address these threats.
- Develop a proposed budget to accomplish its initiatives, and;
- Prepare an annual report on its accomplishments.

U.S.-Mexico counter-narcotics cooperation reached unprecedented levels, with the full range of law enforcement, military, border, and drug control agencies being involved, although corruption remains a persistent problem. Acting through cabinet-level and working groups of the High Level Contact Group (HLCG) on Narcotics Control, the countries announced completion of joint anti-drug strategy goals in February 1998.²⁹

Since the Reagan administration, the FBI has been authorized to operate in foreign countries to protect the right and interests of U.S. citizens. They now have officers in a number of countries, including Mexico, where it has one of its largest foreign offices with approximately 10 staff members. Allegedly the FBI agents develop strategies against "organized crime"³⁰, and actively train Mexican police and intelligence forces. The FBI has about 200 agents assigned to the southwest border and recently requested funds to add 54 agents to their border presence.³¹

The United States criticizes pervasive drug corruption that has reached unprecedented levels, particularly in Mexico. Interdiction operations and crop eradication often are seen as limited, too slow, and ineffective. Some governments regularly refuse to extradite suspected drug traffickers to the United States. On the other hand, some officials argue that the U.S. counter-drug policies often detract from cooperative efforts, complaining about violations of sovereignty. Two examples are U.S. certification of a country's full cooperation in combating drugs, and the "ship-rider" agreements with Caribbean states to facilitate "hot pursuit" of drug traffickers in territorial waters and air space. Governments often accuse Washington of diplomatic extortion: using U.S. drug assistance as an incentive to change national procedures to achieve an outcome America desires.

The U.S. Customs Service has primary responsibility for ensuring that all cargo and passengers moving through ports-of-entry comply with federal law. Customs is the lead agency for preventing drug

trafficking through airports, seaports, and land ports-of-entry. Customs shares responsibility for stemming the flow of illegal drugs into United States via air and sea. It accomplishes this mission by detecting and apprehending drug-smuggling aircraft and vessels trying to enter the country. The *Customs' Air and Marine Interdiction Division* provides seamless twenty-four-hour radar surveillance along the entire southern tier of the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Caribbean using a wide variety of civilian and military ground-based radar, tethered aerostats, reconnaissance aircraft, and other detection sensors.³²

The U.S. Border Patrol specifically focuses on drug smuggling between land ports of entry. In FY 1999, the Border Patrol seized 514,659 kilograms of marijuana, 11,180 kilograms of cocaine, forty-five kilograms of heroin, and 215 kilograms of methamphetamine. In addition the Border Patrol made 6,402 arrests of suspected traffickers in areas other than ports-of-entry.³³

The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction and plays a key role in protecting the U.S. borders. It shares responsibility for air interdiction with the U.S. Customs Service. All U.S. Armed Forces provide invaluable support to law-enforcement agencies involved in drug-control operations, particularly in the southwest border region.³⁴

The problems that law enforcement officials face in stemming the flow of drugs into the United States are significant but not insurmountable. Twenty-three separate federal agencies and scores of state and local governments are involved in drug-control efforts along the borders, air, and seaports. Improved coordination can ensure unity of effort from national policy to state and local levels with case-centered criminal investigations.

The departments of Justice and Treasury and other agencies with responsibilities along the Southwest border continue to enhance their collective capabilities in this vulnerable region. Timely dissemination of information can allow agencies to target trafficking organizations more effectively. An ongoing review of the counter-drug intelligence system is addressing this requirement. All cross-border movements are subject to inspection. It cannot, however, paralyze commerce and travel to search for contraband. Non-intrusive inspection technologies that are cued to high-risk cargo by intelligence are being deployed to keep drugs out of legal commerce. Access roads, fences, lights, and surveillance devices can prevent the movement of drugs between ports of entry while serving the legal, economic, and immigration concerns of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. It must continue to make appropriate staffing investments to ensure adequate numbers of trained and well-equipped inspectors, agents, investigators, and prosecutors.³⁵

The Department of Defense (DoD) provides vital support to the national effort to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by performing detection and monitoring operations. Information gathered by DoD allows interdiction forces to intercept and act against traffickers. Customs also conducts detection and monitoring missions in the transit zone as well as taking direct action against traffickers.³⁶

III. MEXICO'S COUNTER DRUG POLICY.

A. LEGITIMACY

The ways in which the federal government responds to drug abuse and trafficking are outlined in the following laws and executive orders:

The national development plan (*Plan Nacional de desarrollo*)

Provides guidance to the policymakers to develop an integral strategy to face the problems affected for the addictions and drug-trafficking, with the purpose of combating the multiplicity of its dimensions, throughout the social-political commitment of its institutions to participate in close coordination between them and the community.³⁷

The National Constitution, Article 89th, Fraction VI.

The power and obligations of the President are; to make use of the totality of the permanent Armed Forces, Army, Air Force, and Navy, for the security and external defense of the federation.³⁸

Organization Law of the Federal Public Administration, Article 29; Fraction XIX.

Its responsibility of the secretariat of National Defense among others to provide the auxiliary services required by the Army and Air Force, as well as civilian services that such forces indicated by the Federal executive.³⁹

The Secretariat of National Defense is engaged through its "Permanent Combat against drug-trafficking Campaign" which primary objective is intensify the activities of seeking, localization and destruction of drug crops, and air and land interception of the illegal drug trafficking, as well as to contribute

in reducing the violence generated by organized crime related with illegal drug trafficking chemical precursors and firearms.⁴⁰

The *Directive Aztec* is the document that provides guidance to the commanders of all levels for conducting operations against drug trafficking, including activities of eradication and interception. The Secretariat of National Defense implements permanent training actions to prepare the military personnel, the training includes actions related with the *Directive Aztec and Federal Law of Firearms and Explosives*; various detection techniques, force deployment, response against aggressions, and respect for the human rights as well.

B. DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTER DRUG STRATEGY.

The demand of drugs and the utilities that generate with their consumption, constitute elements that contribute to the growth of addiction and the expansion of the illicit activities carried out by drug trafficking organizations to supply markets of consumers.

Reducing the demand, that is in close relation with other illicit activities, such as production, trafficking, commercialization, and perpetration of crimes related with firearms trafficking, money laundering, diversion of chemical precursors to produce drugs, and another activities connected with violence is the objective of the National control drug Program.

At the same time with the interception actions, the application of the law, and the international cooperation those are carrying it out to reduce the supply, it must perform Actions to reduce the demand.

In the international arena, the complexity of the problem indicates the necessity to analyze it and fight against it, because the actions taken by criminal organizations jeopardize, in many cases the international relations, because of the intense cooperation that is demanded, and for the difference in resources available in each country to be use in the struggle against drugs.

Mexico has adopted international agreements in this matter, protecting always the national sovereignty. In bilateral and multinational fora, the Mexican government has strengthened its position against the application of extraterritorial laws that regulate in other countries; in addition Mexico has refused to the establishment of multinational forces to be used in the struggle against drugs; highlighting that each

country must develop, in its interior, the needed actions to control the demand and supply of drugs, as well as the international cooperation should be circumscribed to the interchange of valuable intelligence.

Some international groups have tried to distort this position and harm Mexico's image, addressing conditions of insecurity in strategic zones needed for national development. They do not recognize the efforts made and the co-responsibility that should be assumed by the nations in this struggle. Meanwhile, the demand still exists in the market; it will not be possible to eradicate its supply.

The levels reached by the organized crime related to drug trafficking are distinguished more clearly since the decade of the 90s, and are reflected in crimes such as money laundering, smuggling, firearms trafficking, murder, armed incidents, and kidnappings; furthermore, it is possible to observe actions directed to keep the control of drug production zones, air, land, and maritime transit route toward U.S., and the different markets (national and international).

The more serious aspects of the problem are the drug-trafficking, and money laundering, follow up by the drug production. The traffickers are always seeking out new mechanisms to avoid the governmental controls. They have implicated the expansion of the networks of distribution and commercialization, using to pay in kind and involving greater number of people in drug trafficking in a small scale, causing an increase in the price of the product in the internal market, in addition to the violence generated in some cities because of the dispute for distribution spaces.

The expansion of drug production zones will affect the inhabitants because of the violence, obstructing the application of government's institutional development projects. These are the conditions of some margined sectors of the population from whose criminal organizations are taking in advantage for the illegal drug organizations.

Drug trafficking requires certain security conditions to make profitable its inversion. To do so the narcotraffickers are trying to do any kind of stratagems to corrupt some authorities, diminishing the confidence on the institutions, and at the same time, to represent a threat for the national security.

Under this context, we can say that the problem of illegal drugs for Mexico is manifested in basically, the production and illicit traffic. Even though the consumption is present in the Mexican society, the indicators express that the rate has decreased lightly in the last five years, in those who has consumed

illicit drugs some time in his life. That means that the grave public health problem is the abuse of alcohol and tobacco.

In regards to drug trafficking, the main problem that is facing Mexico is the flow of drugs, essentially cocaine, marijuana and lately heroin, coming from Central and South America. This illegal drug trafficking network has generated ties among criminal organizations with transnational character, with huge amounts of economical resources that allow them to use sophisticated transportation means, and different ways to diminish the effectiveness of authorities in charge of dealing with it.

The trafficking of chemical precursors also represents a similar threat like cocaine, because these chemical substances are utilized in the production of synthetic drugs. It has been detected that Mexico is a receptor of these substances for storage and processing, and its posterior shipping to U.S.

According to estimates by the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Mexico is a major transit point for cocaine entering the United States from South America, and is a major source country for heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine.⁴¹ Estimates of Mexico's share of this traffic have not changed significantly over the years, although recent reports suggest that a larger portion of the cocaine may be coming through the Caribbean rather than Mexico.

The reports stated that Mexican trafficking organizations dominate the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine, and the Mexico is an important source of "designer" drugs and illicit steroids. However, U.S. Mexican interdiction efforts and increasingly demands by Mexican traffickers have led the Colombian cartels to shift back to the Caribbean, with Puerto Rico as a major gateway.⁴²

U.S. Congressional action relating to Mexican drug control and drug certification issues from 1986 to the present. Beginning in 1986, in the context of the 1985 killing of DEA Agent Enrique Camarena, Congress required the President to certify annually, subject to Congressional review, that drug-producing or drug transit countries had cooperated fully with the United States in drug control efforts to avoid a series of aid and trade sanctions.

Mexico has been fully certified each year, despite some criticism, but Congress has closely monitored these certification decisions. Congress took some initial steps on resolutions to disapprove Mexico's certification in 1987 and 1988, and passed some drug-related restrictions on Mexico in 1989 and

1996. Congressional efforts to overturn the President's certification of Mexico advanced the farthest in 1997, when both houses passed modified resolutions of disapproval, which would have required additional reports on Mexican and U.S. drug control efforts. President Clinton reported to Congress in September 1997, in compliance with the Senate-passed version, even though it was never enacted into law. Following President Clinton's certification, on February 26, 1998, that Mexico was fully cooperative in drug control efforts, resolutions of disapproval were introduced in both houses in early March 1998.⁴³

During 1998 and 1999, the government of Mexico announced a number of new initiatives. For example, a federal law for the administration of seized, forfeited and abandoned goods that will allow authorities to use proceeds and instruments seized from crime organizations for the benefit of law enforcement is being considered, a federal law that will establish expedited procedures to terminate corrupt law enforcement personnel is also being considered, and the government of Mexico recently announced the creation of a new national police force. In addition, the government of Mexico has initiated an operation to seal three strategic points in Mexico. The purpose of the program is to prevent the entry of narcotics and diversion of precursor chemicals in the Yucatan peninsula, Mexico's southern border, and the Gulf of California.

Furthermore, the Mexican government recently announced a counter-narcotics strategy to crack down on drug traffickers. Mexico indicated that it plans to spend between \$400 million and \$500 million over the next 3 years to buy new planes, ships, radar and other military and law enforcement equipment. In addition to the new spending, Mexico reported that its new anti-drug efforts will focus on improving coordination among law enforcement agencies and combating corruption more efficiently. A senior Mexican government official termed this new initiative a total war against the scourge of drugs.⁴⁴

In the area of law enforcement cooperation and training, the United States has been involved in the training and screening of Mexicans involved in several important new agencies. These are: the new Mexican anti-drug agency, called the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health (FEADS), that replaced the discredited National Counter-Narcotics Institute (INCD); the Organized Crime Unit that implements the new Organized Crime Law; the anti-drug bilateral Border Task Forces (BTFs); and a Financial Intelligence Unit that implements new anti-money laundering legislation. In military-to-military cooperation, the United States has recently provided military training for Mexican anti-drug special forces (GAFE) units, and has provided two Knox class frigates and training for maritime interdiction units.⁴⁵ Despite the Administration's accounts of cooperation,⁴⁶ stemming from the Bilateral Strategy, the collaboration between Mexican and

U.S. agencies to detect and intercept the illicit trafficking of drugs has increased. In particular, the liaison and information exchange systems among agencies from both countries, regarding air, land and maritime interdiction of drugs, have been strengthened. Currently, Mexico and the United States share useful strategic information to plan operations. Furthermore, the operational coordination between agencies from both countries has improved. These mechanisms have been an important factor, not only to increase drug seizures, but also to deter the international trafficking of drugs in some regions.

Since 1998, the transmission of information among the coordination and communication centers of both countries has improved, allowing authorities to respond as required to interdict illicit shipments. The systems used to link both nations' agencies enable real-time, secure-data electronic transmission.

To improve the permanent mechanism of information exchange, liaison offices have been established for the PGR at the Air and Maritime Interdiction Coordination Center (Centro de Coordinación para la Intercepción Aérea y Marítima) of the U.S. Customs Service, located in Riverside, California. In the immediate future, liaison offices for the PGR will be established with the Joint Interagency Task Force-East (JIATF-E) and Joint Interagency Task Force - West (JIATF-W), in charge of coordinating the U.S. interdiction agencies in the Caribbean and the Pacific, respectively.

The aforementioned mechanisms have enabled important results attained in combating air and maritime drug trafficking. Concerning air drug trafficking, the bilateral collaboration has contributed to practically eliminate cocaine trafficking on flights originating from South America directly to Mexico. The above represents a significant strategic result because this method of trafficking was widely used by criminal organizations to traffic cocaine destined for the United States in the early 90s. From 1998 to date, the Government of Mexico has reported that there have only been two illicit air incursions directly into Mexican air space. In both cases, the aircraft and the shipment were seized and the crew was arrested.

In 1998, the Mexican Government strengthened its detection systems and redefined the approach of its air, land and maritime interdiction strategies. In this sense, the actions to implement Operation Sellamiento (Sealing the Border) in the Baja California and Yucatán peninsulas must be underscored. These actions, performed in 1999, extended northwards to the border and the Gulf of California. For these operations, the Government of Mexico purchased state-of-the-art detection equipment, which included five Mobile Search systems, 21 Secure 1000 systems and 31 Buster systems. Likewise, intensive interdiction operations along the Tehuantepec Isthmus took place, to seal off the land and air trafficking routes in Mexican territory.

In 1999, the Government of Mexico made public its initiative to strengthen the Drug Control General Strategy (Refuerzo a la Estrategia General para el Control de Drogas). The purpose of this document is to strengthen the existing programs, improve training programs, and reinforce the coordination among the Mexican agencies and institutions responsible in combating drug trafficking. This program, representing a three-year budget close to US\$500 million, has begun to provide important results. The Mexican government reports that in 1999 alone, 34.6 tons of cocaine; 1,472 tons of marijuana, 801.2 kg of opium gum and 260.2 kg of heroine was seized. Moreover, during the first semester of 2000, 15. 5 tons of cocaine; 1,014.9 tons of marijuana; 149.8 kg of opium gum and 203.7 kg. of heroin have been seized.

The problem of methamphetamine production and trafficking affects both countries. In the U.S. methamphetamine laboratory destruction is carried out by federal as well as state and local law enforcement. In 1999 the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration seized 2,025 methamphetamine labs while state and local police seized over 5,000. The number of DEA methamphetamine laboratory seizures has increased constantly and sharply for each of the last six years, from 263 in 1994 to over 2,000 in 1999. Methamphetamine trafficking has spread from its traditional area of concentration in the western United States to the Midwest and to a lesser extent the southeastern United States.

Finally, the Government of Mexico underlines that, according to its experience, the four elements to combat this transnational crime and to attack its principal consequences efficiently are:

- Generation and targeted use of specialized intelligence.
- Acquisition of appropriate equipment and its use at the strategic, tactic and operative levels.
- Effective coordination between the responsible national agencies and organizations directly or indirectly involved in combating drug trafficking (integral supply and demand reduction).
- A frank, open and respectful cooperation with all multinational organizations and countries that have an interest in the development of a common front against the effects of international drug trafficking and abuse, with special attention within our hemisphere.

The revelations nearly forced President Clinton to decertify Mexico in this year's report to Congress on international drug cooperation. The President resisted but the damage to Mexico's image had been done, forcing the Mexican government to publicly acknowledge for the first time that drug money had corrupted much of the country's drug enforcement apparatus and many judges and politicians as well. In an interview with the NewsHour last May, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo said his decision to create a

completely new federal police force to combat drugs was evidence of his determination to fight Mexico's drug problem.⁴⁷

"Enormous amounts of violence and corruption on both sides of the border..."

GEN. BARRY McCAFFREY (Ret.)

Director, National Drug Control Policy

Gen. Barry McCaffrey said: Well, I think it's generated enormous amounts of violence and corruption on both sides of the border, more than 200 Mexican police officers murdered, more than 400 violent incidents against our own law enforcement authorities. So we've got an opportunity here. The Gulf Cartel and the ACF (Amado Carrillo Fuentes) gang have both been disrupted by her intensive intervention.⁴⁸

IV. BILATERAL RELATION

A. COORDINATION.

Despite the challenges along the border, there is reason for optimism. The Federal effort is becoming better organized. Federal, State and local enforcement cooperation has never been better. The Government of Mexico wants to work with U.S., and they are in the process of building the healthiest, most mutually beneficial relationship they have ever had. Both nations are finally paying adequate attention to the problems created by the illegal drug trade along the border.⁴⁹

The areas for collaboration area represented in the Bi-national Drug Strategy with the following general objectives:

- Stop the increase in and reduce the illicit consumption, production, and traffic of narcotics and psychotropic substances in both countries.
- In coordination, treat the problems generated by drug in the realms of health and safety in both societies.

- Agree on the actions necessary to reduce the production, trafficking, distribution, and consumption of drugs, as well as to eliminate crimes related to drug such as diversion of precursor and essential chemicals, money laundering, and arms trafficking.

The Bi-national Strategy will complement the national policies defined in the United States *National Drug Strategy* and Mexico's *National Program for Drug Control 1995-2000*. Both nations agreed that bilateral collaboration is achieved on the basis of the following principles: shared responsibility, adoption of an integrated approach to the subject matter, balance and reciprocity, and efficient application of the laws in each country.

The governments of the United States and Mexico will have much to build upon as a result of the sustained collaborative relationship between both countries. Overall, the comprehensive bilateral cooperation policy to control the supply and demand for drugs has resulted in an improved understanding regarding the problems and challenges each country faces.

More specifically, efficient mechanisms for collaboration were developed which ensured measurable results in combating the use and abuse of illicit of drugs, drug trafficking, and drug-related crimes. Specific actions were taken in such areas as data collection, collaborative research, treatment protocols, prevention interventions, arrests and sentencing of members of organized crime groups, and interdiction of drugs, weapons, and chemical precursors. These efforts demonstrated the importances of a balanced approach to drug control, targeting both the demand and supply aspects of drug abuse.

Bilateral cooperation and consultation on counter-narcotics and other law enforcement matters have been actively and effectively pursued during the period of the Zedillo and Clinton Administrations pursuant to the wide variety of agreements and arrangements between Mexico and the United States designed to facilitate joint efforts against crime, including the Treaty on Extradition, the Treaty on Cooperation in Mutual Legal Assistance, the Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement, the Tax Information Exchange Agreement, the Financial Information Exchange Agreement, and the more recently-signed Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in Law Enforcement Activities and Memorandum of Understanding on Currency and Monetary Instruments Reports.⁵⁰

B. BILATERAL INTEGRATION.

The government of the United States and Mexico recognize that the current dimension of international drug trafficking and related crimes extend beyond national boundaries and exceed the capacity of any nation to face them in isolation. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation among nations is necessary to achieve acceptable results in the struggle against production, distribution, trafficking, and consumption of illicit drugs. In this context is necessary that both countries have decided to continue promoting sub-regional, regional, and world cooperation against drugs. United States and Mexico agreed to prepare a bilateral anti-drug cooperation strategy that will complement the national drug control strategies in effect in each country. The strategy was developed with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction of the United States and Mexico.

Much of the cocaine and much of the marijuana, heroine, and methamphetamine consumed in the U.S. comes through Mexico. Mexican drug networks control a substantial portion of illicit drugs distributed in the United States. Conversely, cash and firearms derived from illegal drug trafficking move South from U.S. into Mexico.

Senior levels of the Mexican government are willing to confront the national security threat posed by drug trafficking, drug-related corruption, and violence. Corruption and fragile counter-drug institutions have hurt Mexico. Mexico must remain committed to disrupting drug-trafficking organizations and reducing the amount of illegal substances that enter Mexico and the United States.

In the last four years. Mexico prosecuted a number of high-ranking public officials for corruption. It established a Confidence Control Center to address corruption. Mexico enacted anti-crime laws that strengthen law enforcement and provide the basis for effective prosecution. Cooperation between the two nations improved in terms of coordination. Twenty-five metric tons of cocaine were seized as the result of maritime coordination between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Mexican Navy during the first nine months of 1999. In January 2000, the U.S. and Mexico will conduct the first opium yield survey in almost fifteen years.

In 1998, the United States and Mexico developed a comprehensive bi-national anti-drug strategy. The strategy builds on the Bi-national Drug Threat Assessment and the U.S.-Mexico Alliance against Drugs signed by President Clinton and Zedillo in 1997. The agreement demonstrates the shared commitment to

address drug problems while upholding the principles of sovereignty, mutual respect, territorial integrity, and nonintervention. The U.S./Mexico Performance Measures of Effectiveness, developed in February 1999, are designed to measure progress by Mexico and the U.S. in implementing the bi-national strategy. A second bi-national demand-reduction conference was taken in Tijuana, Mexico in June of 1999, and a third conference will take place in Phoenix, Arizona in May/June of 2000.

Over the long term, the United States and Mexico need to preserve institutions of cooperation like the U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group (HLCG) for Drug Control and the Senior Law enforcement Plenary. Mexico must strengthen its law enforcement and anti-corruption efforts in order to reduce the flow of drugs. Our two nations must also ensure the safety of law enforcement personnel who are confronting violent criminal drug organizations.⁵¹

Like an opportunistic disease attacking a weakened immune system, the drug trade draws strength from the economic, social, and moral decay that corruption fosters. Drug syndicates exacerbate corruption through wealth. Enormous resources give the large drug organizations a nearly open-ended capacity to corrupt. We have seen instances in the recent past where senior officials charged with destroying drug syndicates were in fact in the syndicates' employ. By focusing world attention on the need to eliminate corruption, we can prevent this fate from befalling elected governments.

Stemming corruption and protecting the integrity of a nation's judicial system were central to the global forum on fighting this problem, held in February 1999. Corruption was also discussed at the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy summit held in November 1999. Both fora emphasized the need for justice, security, and financial regulatory officials as well as accountability in the private sector and the required to develop democratic institutions that inspire investor confidence and public support.⁵²

Furthermore, drug trafficking organizations on our Southwest border pose a significant threat to the security and welfare of both countries. The problem demands leadership, clear goals, adequate resources and a long-term commitment. The counter-drug budget for Mexico must move to a seven -year cycle to insure continuity of effort and to allow effective planning. This is a bipartisan issue, and both countries can and must continue to cooperate in the counter-drug efforts. Together its possible to break the major drug trafficking organizations responsible for the bulk of the drug trafficking across the common land border.

Mexico and the United States have recognized that the professionalization and specialization of officials in the different areas of drug control are fundamental to achieving better results. This is why both countries have created extensive bilateral cooperation in the design of technical cooperation and training programs regarding money laundering, the illicit trafficking of weapons, chemical control, and law enforcement.

The collaboration has been especially broad in the field of law enforcement. In compliance with the *Brownsville Letter* agreements, three Bi-national Training Seminars (Columbia, South Carolina, 1998; Mexico City, 1999; and San Diego, California, 2000) have been held, where prosecutors and police officers from both countries participated. These seminars -the first of their kind- were simultaneous training events of law enforcement officials from both countries.

The Seminars are focused on seeking the similarities and differences of the Mexican and U.S. legal systems regarding several matters, such as investigation techniques, combating organized crime, legal wire-tapping, as well as the seizure and forfeiture of assets, among others. These Seminars helped identify areas where the legal cooperation between both parties can be substantially improved, in strict compliance with each country's laws.⁵³

Mexico and the United States share the idea that it is necessary to simultaneously confront the drug problem from a comprehensive supply and demand reduction perspective.

The creation of a high-level bilateral consultation mechanism, specialized in drug control -the HLCG- has facilitated the decision-making and agreement processes between both governments, allowing the bilateral cooperation efforts against drug consumption, drug trafficking and drug-related crimes to be effectively led.⁵⁴

Neither the United States nor Mexico can combat the drug problem alone, so it is imperative that a cooperative mechanism continues to exist and be strengthened in the years ahead. The most important accomplishment has been the development of a strong and vibrant anti drug alliance with a shared view of the threat and firm agreement on what needs to be done. This is something that has never been achieved between two neighboring nations and serves as a model for other countries in confronting trans-national or international threats. We recognize too that the drug problem is not a war to be won but rather a complex and long-term problem that will require the full support and involvement of our societies as well.

"I believe and I want to be very clear about it—that wherever you have drug trafficking, there is corruption. There is perhaps one difference: We are fully recognizing that, and we are facing that challenge".⁵⁵

President Ernesto Zedillo

May 5, 1997

V. CONCLUSIONS

The western hemisphere is already in the 21st century with an unprecedented opportunity to secure a future of stability and prosperity – building on the fact that every country in the hemisphere except Cuba is democratic and committed to free market economies. The end of armed conflicts in Central America and other improvements in regional security have coincided with remarkable political and economic progress throughout the Americas. The Mexican and U.S. governments have developed a more effective bilateral cooperation policy to deal with all issues related to drug control. This cooperation lies within the framework of a set of agreements, mechanisms, and procedures to facilitate long-term policy planning, communication, and coordinated efforts.

The principal security concerns in the hemisphere are transnational in nature, such as drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, illegal immigration, firearms trafficking, and terrorism. In addition, the hemisphere is leading the way in recognizing the dangers to national and regional stability produced by corruption and ineffective legal systems. All these threats, especially drug trafficking, produce adverse social effects that undermine the sovereignty, democracy and national security of nations in the hemisphere.

The Organization of American States (OAS) and other organizations, is possible to eliminate the scourge of drug trafficking in the hemisphere. The multilateral Counter-drug Alliance is striving to better organize and coordinate efforts to extradite and prosecute individuals charged with drug trafficking and related crimes; combat money laundering; seize assets used in criminal activity; halt illicit traffic in chemical precursors; strike at the financial support networks; enhance national drug abuse awareness and treatment programs. Furthermore is necessary also the U.S. continuing to pursue a number of bilateral and regional

counter-drug initiatives. In the Caribbean, and bilaterally with Mexico and Colombia, encouraging the counter-drug and law enforcement cooperation.

The strategies of both countries offer a comprehensive solution to the problems, but that demands a huge effort and resources to reduce the demand and supply of illegal drugs. In the long term the objectives could be reached with the international cooperation without violate the sovereignty of other countries. In this matter the OAS is doing a good job in gaining the consensus of the Latin America countries to gain the full cooperation.

The U.S. as a super power has the responsibility in leading with the problem, being so important to continue to engage in supporting the Latin America countries in dealing with this transnational threat. The L.A. countries on the other hand needs to reinforce the law enforcement agencies at state and local level, because in the case of Mexico almost the whole effort is done by federal agencies including the armed forces.

Decisive education campaigns through national audiences are needed using the media support, and also at all levels of the schooling system in order to reduce the demand. Because with the spill over some sector of the population are affected in countries were the indexes usually were low.

The Mexican Army should continue with the training in the U.S. of the junior and senior officers in counter drug operations. Because the Army will be engaged in this kind of operations at least in the mid term, and always in support of the law enforcement agencies. Meanwhile the law enforcement agencies in Mexico are ready to assume the full responsibility for counter drug operations.

The use of Airmobile Special Forces Groups seems to be a good solution for the interdiction efforts, because it results in economy of forces, but they need the legitimacy to do so. Some reforms should be made at legislative level to give them this attribution in order to exploit the speed and valuable intelligence.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS.

It is necessary to continue working together through programs like the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA). Sharing of information is vital for the success of any kind of joint or bilateral counter-drug operation. During the inter-agency interaction both countries must share information in order to maximize their impact on criminal drug trafficking organizations. Working in this way it is possible to take advantage of the unique experience produced in the border area susceptible to be used in other regions.

The two new administrations have a great challenge to tighten and strengthen their relationships. Now the transition of government in Mexico offers the opportunity to try again and build up the trust in the institutions of both sides of the border in charge of dealing with the problem. The agreements reached last month between the FBI and the Mexico's General Attorney Office about cooperation and training seems to be a big window of opportunity to work together. In this matter it is necessary for the Mexican law enforcement agencies that the U.S. provide the assistance in training and equipment, this last through different kind of methods of acquisition, like FMS.

New ways of cooperation should be implemented. I suggest that some kind of Rules Of Engagement must be drafted with the consensus of both parties in order to avoid the interruption of other agencies that could interrupt the progress of some investigations.

The Mexican Army must be engaged in the struggle against drug trafficking with the same policies described in the *National Drug Control Program* until the Preventive Federal Police will be ready to assume the full responsibility. But taking in consideration the size of the country and the remoteness of the production zones, it is necessary that the Mexican Army, in coordination with other agencies, continue in the eradication. On the other hand, the activities of interdiction could be translated to the Airmobile Special Forces Groups in missions of Rapid Reaction Forces deployed in the most likely air routes. To do so it is necessary and also important to give to this kind of force the legitimacy to be use in interception operations with very clear ROE in supporting missions of other agencies. Meanwhile the Federal Preventive Police achieves this kind of capability.

It is necessary that senior officers of the law enforcement agencies participate in planning and execution exercises in the border area. This will help a lot to gain the unity of doctrine needed to reach cooperation, and provide the flexibility to resolve different kind of conflicts between both countries.

Word count: 13,318

ENDNOTES

¹ United States/Mexico Bi-National Drug Strategy; The United States-Mexico High Level Contact Group for Drug Control (HLCG).P 1.

² Ibid., P. 2.

³ Donald E. Schultz and Edward J. Williams, *Mexico Faces the 21st Century*, Praeger Publishers Westport, CT, 1995 Preface.

⁴ Timothy J. Dunn, *The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992: Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home* (Austin: CMAS Books, University of Texas, 1996).PP. 17-23.

⁵ Conflicting stories and rumors surrounding this event abound. The young man, who was herding his fathers' goats, had reportedly fired shots in the patrols' direction knowingly or unknowingly. See Thaddeus Herrick, "Marine on antidrug duty shoots, kills student," *Houston Chronicle*, 22 May 1997; and William Branigin, "Questions on Military Role Fighting Drugs Ricochet From a Deadly Shot," *Washington Post*, 22 June 1997, among many accounts.

⁶ Joint Task Force 6, *Operational Support Planning Guide, 1 July 1995*, 5. This guide indicates, in this regard, that "Title 10, Active and Reserve Component, military support to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) is governed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) standing rules of engagement. Military personnel deployed to border areas are authorized to be armed with their issued weapons for self-defense only. They may return fire when threatened with deadly force to defend either themselves, accompanying law enforcement personnel or others present. Title 32, *National Guard*, military support to LEAs is governed by similar rules as modified by each state governor." See also S.C. Gwynne, "Border Skirmish," *Time*, 25 August 1997, p. 40.

⁷ U.S. House of Representatives, Amendment 158 to the *National Defense Authorization Act*, 10 June 1999. This amendment, introduced by Representative James A. Traficant Jr., passed by a vote of 242-181.

⁸ The amendment provided for law enforcement training for military personnel, stipulated that military personnel would be accompanied by law enforcement personnel and was not to supercede the *Posse Comitatus Act*, section 1385, Title 18. The National Guard, it should be noted, are not subject to *Posse Comitatus*, though policy restricts their role in arrests and search and seizure. They do, however, conduct port-of-entry vehicle searches in support of the Customs Service.

⁹ "La Cámara de Representantes aprueba militarizar la frontera"; Andrea Becerril, "Enviar soldados, acto ominoso de Washington: Calderón"; and "Inaceptable militarizacion de la frontera," *La Jornada*, 12 June 1999.

¹⁰ In 1997, Representative James A. Traficant won House approval of a program to station up to 10,000 troops on the border. However, the proposal was eventually dropped due to Senate opposition. ("House Approves Troops on Border with Mexico," *Washington Times*, 6 September 1997, and "A Job for the Border Patrol," *Los Angeles Times*, 30 October 1997.) Still earlier calls for expanded military use along the border—often in the course of national political campaigns—received lukewarm receptions. In 1996, for example, Senator Robert Dole's (R) Kansas, presidential campaign highlighted the need for increased military power against drug trafficking, but gained little general interest. (Katharine Q. Seelye, "Dole Calls for Military Role in Fight Against Drugs," *New York Times*, 26 August 1996.)

¹¹ See LTC William Flynt's article, "Threat Convergence," in the September/October 1999 edition of *Military Review* for a discussion of the threats associated with the two PDDs. See also The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: Summary of Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63," Annapolis, MD, 22 May 1998.

¹² GEN Joseph T. Palastra, "The FORSCOM Role in the Joint Arena," *Military Review* (March 1989), 2-9; LTC Joseph L. Robinson, LCDR Carl R. Graham, and MAJ Jeffery R. Oeser, "Homeland Defense: The American Challenge for the 21st Century," *A Common Perspective: USACOM Joint Warfighting Center's Newsletter*, April

1999, 6-11; Richard J. Rinaldo, "Saving Citizen Ryan: US Military Support to Homeland Defense," *A Common Perspective: USACOM Joint Warfighting Center's Newsletter*, April 1999, 6-11; and US Army Training and Doctrine Command (Joint and Army Doctrine Directorate) "White Paper: Supporting Homeland Defense," Fort Monroe, VA, 22 April 1999.

¹³ Levels of organization, planning, weaponry and transportation employed in criminal acts have often blurred the distinction among criminal, insurgent and terrorist perpetrators. A number of the 74 bank robberies that occurred in Mexico City from January 1996 to the end of November 1996 involved well-armed groups that commit crimes and escape. See the *Associated Press* report of 28 November 1996 for an account of two of the most recent Mexico City bank robberies.

¹⁴ Mexican commentators complain that the greater involvement of Mexican military units in counterdrug operations is a consequence of US pressure and American calls to "confront drug trafficking as if it were a foreign invasion." Eduardo R. Huchim, "Narcotráfico: la corrupción militar," *La Jornada*, 8 April 1996.

¹⁵ Among recent, unusual charges are allegations that federal and/or state police personnel in Oaxaca protect poachers who have stolen hundreds of thousands of endangered Olive Ridley sea turtle eggs from the states' ecologically sensitive Pacific beaches. The eggs are sold on the black market for their presumed aphrodisiac qualities. See "Mexico Police Charged With Turtle Poaching," *United Press International* 18 October 1996, received via Internet.

¹⁶ For example, the Defense Secretariat exercised concentrated control of judicial commands and agents in Chihuahua through military prosecutors targeted against the Juárez cartel, with soldiers substituted for law enforcement in Baja California as well. Police were also increasingly "militarized" in Tamaulipas state with the appointment of Army officers as Federal Judicial Police commanders and soldiers "on leave" as police agents. Miguel Concha, "Militarización," *La Jornada*, 2 November 1996; for subsequent developments, Jorge Alberto Cornejo, Alejandro Romero and Martín Sánchez, "Mas relevos militares a la PJF y al INCD en BC y Chihuahua," *La Jornada*, 21 February 1997; Meliton García and Miguel Dominguez, "Soldiers Replace Police in Tamaulipas," *Reforma*, 5 March 1997, as translated in FBIS-LAT-97-048.

¹⁷ Gregory Gross, "Mexican Army Takes Command of War on Crime," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 5 December 1996, received via Internet. One estimate asserted that 29 of 31 states had military involvement in law enforcement of some type.

¹⁸ Araceli De La Torre Moreno, "Nueva Generación," *Revista del Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos*, 4-5. The army has long expressed private—and sometimes public—contempt for the professionalism of PJF and PJE components and especially their endemic corruption. In particular, army spokesmen continue to allege that the PJF in particular protects and facilitates the operations of narcotraffickers. There have been a number of encounters between Army and police units in the field during counterdrug operations to include, on occasion, firefights.

¹⁹ For a good recent treatment of Mexico's counterdrug efforts, see María Celia Toro, Mexico's "War" on Drugs: *Causes and Consequences, Studies on the Impact of the Illegal Drug Trade*, vol. 3 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).

²⁰ U.S. Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2000*, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Washington D.C. March 2000, pp. 3

²¹ *Ibid. 11-12.*

²² Main Results and Performance Measures of Effectiveness; *U.S.-Mexico Bi-National Cooperation Against Illicit Drugs* 1995-2000. pp. 1-7;

²³ Abel Barajas; *Grupo Reforma; Mexico March 9, 2001*. PGR and FBI will fight the drug trafficking crime. The Mexican General Attorney Rafael Macedo de la Concha, considered that such a low enforcement project is the most important issue of the last meetings held among his counterparts, specially with Louis Free, FBI Director. pp 3

²⁴ U.S. State Department, information prior to January 20, 2001; *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998*; Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; U.S. Department of State; Washington, DC, February 1999. pp 12-13.

²⁵ *National Drug Control Strategy 1999*; office of National Drug Control Policy: p 3.

²⁶ *National Drug Control Strategy 2000*; office of National Drug Control Policy: Evolution of National Drug Strategy; 2000Annual report.pp-4

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 67.

²⁸ *U.S. General Accounting Office; Information on High Intensity Drug Trafficking areas Program*; March, 1998. the high Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program is Ran by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) coordinates federal, state, and local efforts to combat drug trafficking in critical areas of the United States.

²⁹ *CRS Report for Congress; Received through the CRS Web; Mexico's Counter-Narcotics Efforts Under Zedillo, December 1994 to March 1998*; K. Larry Storrs Specialist in Latin American Affairs; Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division: *This report provides information on Mexico's counter-narcotics efforts under the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo from December 1994 to March 1998 in the context of President Clinton's February 26, 1998 certification that Mexico was fully cooperative in drug control efforts.*

³⁰ *El financiero* (Nov. 6, 1994)

³¹ *La Jornada* (May 17, 1996).

³² *National Drug Control Strategy, 2000 Annual Report*; Office of National Drug Control Policy. Washington D.C. p. 73.

³³ *Ibid.*, 73.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 73.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 70.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 73.

³⁷ The Development National Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo) 1994-2000.pp. 3

³⁸ National Constitution of the United Mexican States, (Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos). p. 33.

³⁹ Organization Law of the Federal Administration, Article 29; Fraction XIX. pp. 3

⁴⁰ Mexican Government; “*National Drug Control Program 1995-2000*”; Report and evaluation, 1994 –1998; p 71.

⁴¹ See U.S. Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports*, generally issued in March of each year with coverage of the previous year.

⁴² Douglas Farah and Serge F. Kovaleski, Cartels Make Puerto Rico a Major Gateway to the U.S., *Washington Post*, February 16, 1998, p A1.

⁴³ For details on the certification options (certification, national interests certification, decertification) and the possible sanctions, see Narcotics Certification and Mexico: *Questions and Answers, CRS Report 97-320 F, March 6, 1997*, by Raphael F. Perl, Jonathan Sanford, and K. Larry Storrs. For more general information on U.S.-Mexican relations, including legislation on trade, immigration, and drug trafficking issues, see Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for the 105th Congress, CRS Issue Brief 97028, by K. Larry Storrs.

⁴⁴ **U.S. General Accounting Office; Drug Control:** Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the counter-narcotics efforts of the United States and Mexico, focusing on: (1) Mexico's efforts in addressing the drug threat; and (2) the status of U.S. counter-narcotics assistance provided to Mexico. Update on U.S.-Mexican Counter-narcotics Efforts (Testimony, 02/24/99, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-86).pp 11-12

⁴⁵ See Office of **National Drug Control Policy, Report to Congress**, Volume 1, Part 1, September 1997.

⁴⁶ Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson, U.S. Mexican Drug Collaboration Fails When Lives on the Line, **Washington Post**, November 5, 1997, p. A1.

⁴⁷ **Online Focus**-September 7, 1997; Online Newshour -Interview with Newsmaker Charles Krause at the end of the visit of U.S./Mexico border of General Barry McCaffrey, Drug Policy head for the U.S. Federal government. pp 3.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 5-7.

⁴⁹ **U.S. General Accounting Office**, Statement by General Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy Submitted for the Record to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Wednesday, 31 July 1996

⁵⁰ Main Results and Performance Measures of Effectiveness; **U.S.-Mexico Bi-National Cooperation Against Illicit Drugs 1995-2000**. pp. 8-9.

⁵¹ National Drug Control Policy/Office of National Drug Control Policy; **National Drug Control Policy 2000**; International Drug-Control Cooperation; Bilateral cooperation with Mexico. Pp 3

⁵² Ibid., 7.

⁵³ Main Results and Performance Measures of Effectiveness; **U.S.-Mexico Bi-National Cooperation Against Illicit Drugs 1995-2000**. pp. 14-15.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 15-17.

⁵⁵ **Online Focus**-September 7, 1997; Online Newshour -Interview with Newsmaker Charles Krause at the end of the visit of U.S./Mexico border of General Barry McCaffrey, Drug Policy head for the U.S. Federal government. He discusses the efforts of the American and Mexican governments to combat drug production and delivery with Eduardo Ibarrola. Mexico's Deputy Attorney General.

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